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Abstract 
The role of audit committees and audit quality in ensuring the quality of corporate financial reporting has come 
under considerable scrutiny due to recent high-profile earnings management cases in the world. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine the association between the audit committee effectiveness, audit quality and earnings 
management practices of more active 50 Egyptian companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange of the non-
financial sector during the period 2007-2010. After controlling for size, leverage and cash flow from operation 
activities, the results of univariate and multivariate analyses indicated that audit committees independence; 
experience of audit committee members; audit committee meetings; and audit quality have significant negative 
association with discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. On the other hand, no significant 
relationship is found between audit committees size and the level of discretionary accruals. This paper is important 
because it offers useful information that is of great value to policy makers, academics and other stakeholders. 
Keywords: Audit Committee Effectiveness, Audit Quality, Earning Management, Egypt 
 
1. Introduction 
The end of the 1990s and the beginning of 21st century have witnessed a series of corporate accounting scandals 
across the United States and Europe. Examples include Enron, Parmalat, Tyco, WorldCom and Xerox. At the 
core of these scandals was usually the phenomenon of earnings management (Goncharov, 2005). Earnings 
management has been a great and consistent concern among practitioners and regulators and has received 
considerable attention in the accounting literature. It has been argued that earnings management masks the true 
financial results and position of businesses and obscures facts that stakeholders ought to know (Loomis, 1999). 
 
The effectiveness of audit committees has been a subject of increasing interests due to increased concerns about 
the quality of corporate financial reporting process caused by recent accounting scandals. Abbott et al., (2004) 
report that an audit committee that is independent, meets at least four times a year, and includes at least one 
member with financial expertise is negatively associated with the occurrence of earnings management.  
 
Also, the role of auditing in ensuring the quality of reported earnings has come under considerable scrutiny due 
to recent corporate accounting scandals (Balsam et al., 2003). The agency problems associated with the 
separation of ownership and control, along with information asymmetry between management and absentee 
owners, create the demand for external audit. External auditors are responsible for verifying that the financial 
statements are fairly stated in conformity with GAAP and that these statements reflect the ‘true’ economic 
condition and operating results of the entity. Thus, the external auditor’s verification adds credibility to the 
company’s financial statements. Therefore, a quality audit is expected to constrain opportunistic earnings 
management (Lin & Hwang, 2010). 
 
In Egypt, several mechanisms was adopted in the last decade, which aims to increase levels of transparency and 
confidence in the content of financial reporting, these mechanisms include Egyptian Accounting Standards, and 
the code of corporate governance (2005, 2011), and the creation of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(EFSA). In spite of all this mechanisms, the ability of companies to manipulate financial reports through the 
earnings management still exists, especially since these management practices are legally and within the 
flexibility allowed by the accounting standards which differ from illegal practices and that are classified as cases 
of fraud (Metawee, 2013).  
 
Empirical evidences on the effect of audit committee effectiveness and audit quality on the occurrence of 
earnings management is rather inconsistent. Also, there has so far been relatively little or no research into 
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earnings management practices in Egypt (Kamel & Elbana, 2012). The multi-cultural roots of Egyptian society 
make it different from other societies and hence distinguish it as a setting for this study. Therefore, the purpose 
of this paper is to examine the association between the audit committee effectiveness, audit quality and earnings 
management practices of more active 50 Egyptian companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange of the non-
financial sector during the period 2007-2010.  
 
This study provides many recommendations to the regulatory authorities in Egypt regarding ways to strengthen 
and reinforce audit committee effectiveness and audit quality. Also, this study is the first to include several 
variables related to audit committee effectiveness and audit quality that have been shown to have a strong effect 
on the quality of reported earnings in Egyptian companies. 
 
This study proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review and development of hypothesis. 
Section three describes the methodology, and the data. Section four reports the empirical results and the 
robustness checks. Finally, section five concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Development of Hypothesis 
Various definitions exist for earnings management. Schipper (1989) appears to have captured the essence of 
earnings management by defining it as “purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process with 
the intent of obtaining private gain”. Likewise, Healy & Wahlen (1999) state that “earnings management occurs 
when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. Regardless of the definition adopted, 
earnings management is inherently unobservable. 
 
Opportunistic earnings management practice produces less reliable accounting earnings that do not reflect a 
firm’s financial performance. Earnings management is likely to reduce the quality of reported earnings and its 
usefulness for investment decisions, thus reducing investor confidence in the financial reports. However, 
accounting earnings are more reliable and of higher quality when managers, opportunistic behaviour is reduced 
using monitoring systems (Wild, 1996; and Dechow et al., 1996). Thus, stock market regulators and other 
investor protection agencies are concerned about earnings management, especially after the collapse of several 
large firms in recent decades and they have responded by enhancing audit committee effectiveness and audit 
quality.   
 
Empirical evidences on the effect of audit committee effectiveness and audit quality on the occurrence of 
earnings management is rather inconsistent. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine the association 
between the audit committee effectiveness, audit quality and earnings management practices.  
 
2.1. Audit Committee Effectiveness and Earning Management 
An audit committee plays an important monitoring role to assure the quality of financial reporting and corporate 
accountability (Carcello & Neal, 2003). As a liaison between the external auditor and the board, an audit 
committee bridges the information asymmetry between them, facilitates the monitoring process, and enhances 
the independence of an auditor from management (Klein, 2002). A properly functioning audit committee is thus 
critical in enhancing effective oversight of the financial reporting process and achieving high quality financial 
controls. 
Since the value of a firm is linked to reported earnings figures, it creates economic incentives or pressures for 
management to engage in earnings management. According to the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999) report, 
audit committee report serves as an ultimate monitor of the financial reporting system; the committee selects the 
outside and question management, external auditor and internal auditor to determine whether they are acting in 
the best interest of the company. One of the primary function of the audit committee is to safe cards the 
independence of external auditor, given the strong economic or personnel affiliation of inside directors with the 
company or its management. Audit committees that have a majority of affiliated directors will be more likely to 
side with management in any disputes with the auditor (Ebrahim, 2007). In addition Klein (2002) finds that an 
independent audit committee and active audit committee are associated with lower levels of discretionary, 
earning management is negatively associated with a committee composed only of independent directors, that 
meet more than twice a year .(Siregar &  Utama, 2008). It is expected, therefore, that good characteristics of 
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audit committees are associated with good company financial performance, which in turn, are negatively 
associated with the earnings management. 
 
Apart from the benefit that is gained from the audit committee establishment, previous studies suggested that 
audit committee size; the independence of members; expertise; and meeting frequency of audit committees 
impact their monitoring effectiveness (DeZoort & Salterio, 2001; Klein, 2002; Siregar & Utama, 2008; and 
Metawee, 2013). This study will examine the audit committee effectiveness on earnings management by 
examine the effect of audit committee size; the independence of members; expertise; and meeting frequency of 
audit committees on earnings management. 
 
2.1.1. Audit Committee Size and Earnings Management  
The number of audit committee members is used as an indication of resources available to this committee (Lin, 
et al., 2006). Some studies, such as those of Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996), suggest that the number of 
members on an audit committee affects its decisions. Bédard et al., (2004) argue that the larger the audit 
committee, the more likely it is to uncover and resolve potential problems in the financial reporting process 
because it is likely to provide the necessary strength and diversity of views and expertise to ensure effective 
monitoring. Empirical studies provide mixed evidence of the impact of audit committee size on financial 
reporting quality. Xie et al., (2003) find no significant association between the number of directors on the audit 
committee and earnings management. Similarly, Abbott et al., (2004) find no impact of audit committee size on 
earnings restatement. On the other hand, Yang & Krishnan (2005) find that audit committee size is negatively 
associated with earnings management, implying that a certain minimum number of audit committee members 
may be relevant to quality of financial reporting.  
 
The Egyptian Corporate Governance Code (2005, 2011) suggests that the minimum number of audit committee 
members should be three directors. Accordingly, Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is 
developed: 
 
H1. There is a significantly negative association between audit committee size and the occurrence of 
earnings restatement. 
 
2.1.2. Independence of Audit Committee Members and Earning Management 
An audit committee should be independent from management in order to be able to conduct effective 
monitoring, resulting in less opportunistic management behaviour, such as earnings management. The quality 
and credibility of financial reporting can be badly affected when the audit committee has low or no independence 
(Lin, et al., 2006). Independence of audit committee members has been the focus of most of the prior work. A 
common expectation is that independent audit committee directors would ensure better financial reporting (SEC, 
2003), and the expectation is generally supported by existing empirical evidence (Abbott et al., 2000; and 
Beasley et al., 2000). Specifically, Abbott et al., (2004) document a negative association between occurrence of 
earnings restatement and audit committee consisting of only independent directors. Similarly, Choi et al., (2004) 
find that, when members of the audit committee hold shares in their firm, they are less effective in mitigating 
earnings management. Thus, the independence of the audit committee is a key factor in enhancing its role in 
preventing mis-statements in the financial statements. 
 
In Egypt, the Corporate Governance Code (2005, 2011) encourages the establishment of an audit committee to 
facilitate improving the quality of Egyptian financial reporting. With regard to the composition of the audit 
committee, the Code further requires that independent directors should be in majority. Accordingly, Based on the 
above discussion, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H2. There is a significantly negative association between audit committee independence and the 
occurrence of earnings restatement. 
 
2.1.3. Audit Committee’s Financial Expertise and Earning Management 
Audit committees with financial expertise are important as they show support for auditors (DeZoort et al., 2003; 
DeZoort & Salterio, 2001), the credibility of the financial statement (Burrowes and Hendriks, 2005), and the 
high quality of reported earnings (Choi et al., 2004). DeZoort & Salterio (2001) argue that the audit committee’s 
financial expertise increases the likelihood that detected material misstatements will be communicated to the 
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audit committee and corrected in a timely fashion. Choi et al., (2004), Abbott et al., (2004), and Bédard et al., 
(2004) show that the presence of at least one member with financial expertise sitting on the audit committee is 
negatively related to the level of earnings management. 
 
In Egypt the Corporate Governance Code (2005, 2011) stating that, “The board should satisfy itself that at least 
one member of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience”. But The Code does not define 
a financial expert as someone who has a professional qualification from one of the professional accountancy 
bodies. To examine the relationship between the audit committee’s financial expertise and earnings quality, this 
study tests the H3:  
 
H3. There is a significantly negative association between the audit committee’s financial expertise and the 
occurrence of earnings management 
 
2.1.4. Audit Committee Meetings and Earnings Management. 
Effective audit committees meet regularly to ensure that the financial reporting process is functioning properly, 
and therefore a well-functioning and active audit committee may be able to prevent earnings management. An 
important objective for an audit committee is to provide its members with sufficient time to perform their duties 
of monitoring their firm’s financial reporting process (Lin & Hwang, 2010). Menon and Williams (1994) find 
that audit committee effectiveness can be measured by the number of audit committee meetings. The number of 
meetings is used in prior research because inactive audit committees are unlikely to monitor management 
effectively (Menon & Williams, 1994). The prior research provides inconsistent evidence on the issue. For 
example, Lin et al., (2006) and Xie et al., (2003) report a negative association between earnings management 
and the number of audit committee meetings. In contrast, Bédard et al., (2004), and Yang & Krishnan (2005) fail 
to find such an association. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H4. There is a significantly negative association between audit committee meetings and the occurrence of 
earnings management. 
 
2.2. Audit Quality and Earning Management  
In a capital market where financial reports are a key feature of communication with respect to public firms’ 
performance and financial position, the auditor is perceived as an effective third party who helps mitigate 
information asymmetry and conflict of interests between management and investors. Mansi, et al., (2004) 
identify two roles of an auditor: the information role and the insurance role. As an information intermediary, an 
auditor is a person who independently and effectively verifies the correctness of company’s financial statements 
before they are published. As an insurance provider, on the other hand, an auditor is a person who is legally 
accountable for damages to financial statement users. Auditors therefore carry out primary responsibility for 
promoting transparency in financial reporting processes that in turn generate high quality financial statements. In 
other words, auditors are one of the key drivers that help promote the transparency of the stock markets. 
 
The literature recognizes that the Big four auditors provide higher quality audits and offer greater reliability to 
clients’ financial statements than the non-Big 4 auditors. Krishnan (2003) demonstrate that Big 4 auditors are 
better at constraining client earnings management compared to non-Big 4 auditors; they find that clients of non-
Big 4 auditors have higher levels of discretionary accruals. In the same context, Ahsen (2011) find that Big 4 
auditors associate with less earnings management in the firms. Indeed, Big 4 audit companies are assumed to 
have higher audit quality than non-Big 4, because they are less dependent on their clients. Similarly, Francis and 
Yu (2009) and Choi et al., (2010) have shown that audit office size is a primary determinant of audit quality. 
Also, Craswell et al., (1995) document that clients of the Big 4 auditors have lower total values of discretionary. 
Thus, based on prior findings that Big 4 auditors limit their clients’ ability to manage earnings through accruals, 
we expect that their clients will chose to more real earnings management given motivations to manage earnings. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: There is a significantly negative association between audit quality and the occurrence of earnings 
management. 
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2.3. Audit Committees and Auditing Profession in Egypt 
In Egypt, the formation of an audit committee has been the main focus of the government since the early 1990s. 
However, the formation of audit committee was only on a voluntary basis. It was only in 2000 that the formation 
of an audit committee was made mandatory for all companies listed on The Egyptian exchange (the executive 
regulations of Act No. 93 for the year 2000). The inclusion of the formation of an audit committee as one of the 
Egyptian exchange listing requirements is complementary with the government initiatives to strengthen the 
corporate governance of all listed companies in Egypt. The Egyptian financial supervisory authority (EFSA), 
which was established in 2009, is responsible for regulating the market and ensuring good governance practices 
among listed companies. As part of the listing requirements, the practice of corporate governance must be 
disclosed in annual reports of listed companies (Metawee, 2013).  
 
The country started to develop a Corporate Governance Code only in 2005 and the audit committee section is not 
more than a page. The most important elements discussed in the codes in relation to audit committees are: The 
audit committees should be comprised from non-executive Board of Directors members but with a minimum of 
three, with an option of hiring members from outside of the company. There should be at least one member as a 
financial expert. The General Assembly should issue, upon a recommendation from the Board of Directors, a 
manual for hiring audit committee members and determine their duration, responsibilities and remuneration. The 
management should provide audit committee with all available resources and help to conduct its responsibilities 
including appointment of external advisors and counsels. 
 
Regarding auditing profession, Egypt has a combined structure of the auditing firms. All the major international 
auditing firms have a presence in Egypt in addition to well-established local auditing firms. It might be expected 
that international auditing firms working in Egypt would be more familiar with IAS including parts of the IAS 
which are not publicly available in Arabic. As a result, it is expected that Egyptian companies audited by one of 
the international auditing firms will comply more closely with the IAS. KPMG, Ernst and Young, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, and Price Waterhouse Coopers are the major international accountancy and legal firms with 
local partnership. 
 
Almost all ISA are applicable in Egypt. Auditors are required to follow the six Egyptian auditing standards that 
relate to an auditor’s report, and any ISA that relates to other aspects of the auditing process. Knowledge 
deficiencies of most practitioners by ISA in practice restrict ensuring sound auditing practice. Although large 
auditing firms have greater competence to provide high auditing quality, compliance with the applicable auditing 
standards is not always ensured: in this respect the large firms differ from the small firms. Abd-Elsalam & 
Weetman (2003) noticed in Egypt that international auditing firms, in most cases, stated that the financial 
statements were prepared according to the IAS. In many cases, international auditing firms referred to 
compliance with IAS, but not the ISA. In contrast, local auditing firms, in most cases, stated that the financial 
statements were prepared according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) without giving any 
further explanation of what the phrase meant. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1: Sample selection 
The sample in the current study consists of the Egyptian companies from amongst the top 50 most active-traded 
companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange over the period 2007-2010. financial companies; e.g. banks, 
insurance companies, and leasing companies; were excluded from the sample due to the different requirements 
of disclosure and corporate governance. Hence their annual reports may be not comparable to those of other 
companies. This gave us a sample of 40 firms. As no relevant Data Stream exists in Egypt, the annual reports, 
covering the four year period 2007-2010, were purchased from the Egyptian Company for Information 
Dissemination (EGID) to extract the information on the variables needed to test each of the research hypotheses. 
 
 
3.2 The proxy for earnings management: dependent variable 
Consistent with prior research, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial misrepresentation or 
earnings management. Most prior literature uses Modified Jones (1991) model because it was found to be 
superior to other extant methods at the time in detecting abnormal accruals i.e. discretionary accruals (Dechow & 
Skinner, 2000). Discretionary accruals (DA) are defined as the difference between total accruals (TA) and non-
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discretionary accruals (NDA). In order to find discretionary accruals we calculated first of all total accruals (TA) 
as follows (Collins & Hriber, 2002; and Shah et al., 2009): 
TAt = N.It – CFOt                                                                           Eq. (1) 
Where: TAt, is total accrual in year t.; N.It, is Net Income in year t; and CFOt, is cash flows from operating 
activities in year t. 
 
Second, we calculated non-discretionary accruals (NDA) as follows (Johari et al., 2008 and Shah et al., 2009): 
 =   	
 +  
∆∆
	

 +  ∆	 
 + 	ε                   Eq. (2) 
Where: ∆REV t is revenues in year t less revenue in year t-1; ∆RECt is net receivables in year t less net 
receivable in year t-1; ∆PPEt is gross property plant and equipment at the end of year t; At-1 is total assets at the 
end of year t-1; α1, α2, α3 are firm specific parameters; and ε is the residuals. 
 
Finally, we calculated discretionary accruals (DAC) as a proxy for earnings management as follows (Shah et al., 
2009):                  
DACt = TAt– NDAt                                                                           Eq. (3) 
Where: DACt, is discretionary component of accruals in year t; TAt, is total accrual in year t; and NDAt, is non-
discretionary accruals in year t. 
 
3.3 Independent variables 
The explanations of dependent; independents; and control variables are presented in Table 1. Most 
measurements and expected relations are consistent with prior researches (Klein, 2002; Piot & Janin, 2007; 
Peasnell et al., 2005; and Metawee, 2013).    
 
 
Table 1: Dependent; Independents and Control Variables 
Variables Indicator
s 
Expecte
d  Signs 
Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Discretionary Accruals  
DAC 
 Measured by the modified Jones model. 
Independent Variables  
Audit Committee Size  
ACSIZE 
- It is a total number of audit committee 
members.  
Audit Committee 
Independence 
 
ACIND 
- An indicator variable equal to “1” if all 
the audit committee members are 
independent, “0” otherwise. 
Audit Committee 
Member’s Expertise 
 
ACEXP 
- An indicator variable equal to “1” if at 
least one of the audit committee members 
is a financial expert, and “0” otherwise. 
Audit Committee 
Meetings  
 
ACMET 
- Number of meetings of audit committees 
per year. 
Audit Quality   
AUQUL 
- An indicator variable equal to “1” if the 
auditor is a Big-4 firm, and “0” otherwise. 
Control Variables  
Firm size FISIZE - Natural log of total assets. 
Financial Leverage  FLEV + Debt-to-assets ratio 
Cash Flows from 
Operating Activities 
CFO - Cash flows from operating activities 
divided by total assets at the beginning of 
the period. 
 
3.4. Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variables discussed above, a number of control variables are included in this study 
to control for firm characteristics that can influence the occurrence of earning management. Large firms face 
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greater political costs relative to their small counterparts. However, Meek et al., (2007) argue that earnings 
management may be lower in large firms because, compared to other firms they have lower information 
asymmetry, stronger governance structures and stronger external monitoring. Also, empirical research 
documents that firms with financing needs and firms approaching debt covenant default triggers have higher 
levels of abnormal accruals, a higher incidence of GAAP violation and a higher likelihood of committing 
accounting fraud (Weber, 2006). The larger the firm is leveraged, the more likely managers are to choose income 
decreasing. We use debt-to-assets ratio (LEV) to proxy for the effects of debt covenants on earnings 
management (Peasnell et al., 2005). This study also controls for the effect of cash flows from operating activities 
(CFO) to capture performance differences across firms in different industries and to control for the effect of 
economic activity on earnings management. Jiang et al., (2008) note that firms with a strong operating cash flow 
performance are less likely to manage discretionary accruals upwards because they are already performing well. 
Conversely, firms with a low operating cash flow are more likely to manage discretionary accruals downwards. 
Dechow et al., (1995) shows that CFO influences the magnitude of discretionary accruals, and higher CFOs are 
associated with lower discretionary accruals. Consistent with prior research, such as that of Peasnell et al., 
(2005), this study defines CFO as cash flows from operating activities divided by total assets at the beginning of 
the period. 
 
3.5. Model specification 
To test our hypotheses, we utilize the following logistic regression model, where the dependent variable is 
(DAC). The independent variables are (ACSIZE); (ACIND); (ACEXP); (ACMT) for audit committee 
effectiveness and (AUQUL) for audit quality. The other variables in the model are included to control for factors 
related financial characteristics of the firms that may influence management’s decision to manage or manipulate 
reported earnings: 
 
DAC = β0 + β1 ACSIZE + β2 ACIND + β3 ACEXP + β4 ACMT + β5 AUQUL  
                 + β 6 FISIZE+ β7 FLEV + β8 CFO + ε                                        Eq. (4)         
Where: DAC, discretionary accruals; ACSIZE, audit committee size; ACIND, audit committee independence; 
ACEXP, audit committee member’s expertise; ACMT, audit committee meetings; AUQUL, audit quality; 
FISIZE, firm size; FLEV, financial leverage; CFO,   cash flows from operating activities; and ε, the error term. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the mean, median and standard deviation of the variables in the study. The results reveal that 
average DAC stood at –0.9875, while the median is 3.0176 from prior year’s total assets.  With regard to audit 
committees size, the results indicate that the mean size for audit committee at 4.69 members consistent with 
Raghunandan & Rama (2007). Also, it appears from Table 2 regarding the composition of audit committees, that 
the average ratio of independent directors is (79%). As shown in table 2, about 58% of audit committees in this 
study meet the Egyptian (2005, 2011) Corporate Governance Code’s requirement of having at least one financial 
expert as a member of the audit committee. The average number of audit committee meetings in this sample is 
4.94; this result is consistent with previous findings by Xie et al., (2003) and Metawee, (2013). Also, results 
reveal that (31%) of companies sampled are audited by the big 4 audit firms. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for study variables 
Variable Label Mean Median Std. Deviation 
discretionary accruals 
Audit Committee Size 
Audit Committee Independence 
Audit Committee Member’s Expertise 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit Quality 
Firm Size 
Financial Leverage 
Cash Flows from Operating Activities 
DAC 
ACSIZE 
ACIND 
ACEXP 
ACMT 
AUQUL 
FISIZE 
FLEV 
CFO 
-0.9875 
4.6944 
0.7952 
0.5856 
4.9444 
0.3196 
13.928 
-0.9123 
0.1079 
3.0176 
3.8758 
0.6841 
0.48691 
4.0196 
2.6952 
11.9384 
-0.9010 
0.0846 
7.87658 
2.40023 
4.86532 
0.50395 
2.75623 
0.46790 
2.60871 
4.05437 
0.07614 
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4.2. Correlation matrix and multicollinearity analysis 
Multicollinearity in explanatory variables has been diagnosed through analyses of correlation factors and 
Variable Inflation Factors (VIF). Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the study, from 
which, it has been observed that the highest simple correlation between independent variables was 0.784 
between auditor committee independence (ACIND) and audit quality (AUQUL). Bryman & Cramer (1997) 
suggest that simple correlation between independent variables should not be considered harmful until they 
exceed 0.80 or 0.90. This confirms that there is no multicollinearity among the variables. The further 
confirmation of mutlitolinearity assumption is checked by variance inflation factor (VIF). The (VIF) in excess of 
10 should be considered an indication of harmful multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1989). Alternatively, if the 
average VIF is substantially greater than 1 then the regression may be biased (Bowerman & O'Connell, 1990). 
Table 4 shows that the average VIF (1.17) is close to 1 and this confirms that collinearity is not a problem for 
this model. These findings suggest that multicollinearity between the independent variables is unlikely to pose a 
serious problem in the interpretation of the results of the multivariate analysis. 
 
4.3. Multivariate analysis 
As in many previous disclosure studies, regression analysis has been preferred to investigate the association 
between effectiveness of audit committees and audit quality on the occurrence of earnings management of 
Egyptian companies. Results of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression in Table 4 show that the F-ratio is 
10.65 (P = 0.00). The result statistically supports the significance of the model. The value obtained for the 
adjusted coefficient of determination R square of the model was .634. This tells us how much of the variance in 
the dependent variable (occurrence of discretionary accruals) is explained by the model. Given these results, the 
study concludes that the variables considered in the model largely explain the occurrence of discretionary 
accruals. 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients Matrix of the variables used in the study: 
4.4. Results of Regression Model 
Table 4 reports the multivariate logistic regression results. The H1 states that there is a significantly negative 
association between audit committee size and occurrence of earnings management. As shown in Table 3 and 4, 
this hypothesis is not supported. No significant relationship is found between audit committees size (ACSIZE) 
and the level of discretionary accruals (coefficient = -0.016 and p > 0.05). However, although no statistically 
significant relationship is detected, a negative directional sign of the coefficient is observed. This result may 
support the argument that larger audit committees do not significantly enhance the quality of financial reporting. 
This result is similar to that of the vast majority of studies, such as those of Xie et al., (2003), Abbott et al., 
(2004), and Bédard et al., (2004) that examine the effect of audit committee’s size on earnings management, and 
fail to find a significant impact of audit committee size on earnings management. 
 
The H2 states that there is a significantly negative association between audit committee independence (ACIND) 
and occurrence of earnings management. As shown in Table 3 and 4, this hypothesis is supported (coefficient = -
0.472 and p < 0.05). This is consistent with prior studies, such as those of Beasley (1996); and Piot and Janin 
(2007) that empirically find that audit committee independence is strongly associated with lower levels of 
earnings management. Also, the H3 states that the financial expertise of audit committee (ACEXP) is 
significantly negatively associated with occurrence of earnings management. The result presented in Table 3 and 
Variabl
e 
DAC ACSIZ
E 
ACIN
D 
ACEXP ACMT AUQU
L 
FISIZ
E 
FLEV CFO 
DAC 1         
ACSIZ
E 
-0.016 1        
ACIND -0.472 0.022 1       
ACEXP -0.508 0.082 0.081 1      
ACMT -0.385 -0.019 0.010 -0.047 1     
AUQU
L 
-0.472 0.209 0.784 0.028 0.032 1    
FISIZE 0.547 0.250 0.189 0.023 -0.006 0.428 1   
FLEV -0.116 0.012 -0.006 -0.026 -0.036 0.555 -0.111 1  
CFO -0.265 0.114 0.040 -0.006 -0.033 0.487 0.272 0.177 1 
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4 is supported this hypothesis (coefficient = -0.508 and p < 0.05). The result suggests that audit committees that 
include at least one member with financial expertise are likely to discourage management from manipulating the 
earnings figures in annual reports. This result is also consistent with the vast majority of the previous research 
that investigates the effect of financial experts on earnings management, such as that of Choi et al., (2004); Park 
& Shin (2004); Carcello & Neal (2003); Chen et al., (2005); and Metawee, (2013). 
 
Table 4. Regression results 
DAC = β0 + β1 ACSIZE + β2 ACIND + β3 ACEXP + β4 ACMT + β5 AUQUL  
+ β 6 FISIZE+ β7 FLEV + β8 CFO + ε 
Variable β t-value Sig. VIF 
Constant 4.431 3.897 0.000  
ACSIZE 2.897 3.197 0.287 1.08 
ACIND 0.046 .726 0.024 1.07 
ACEXP -0.358 -0.272 0.001 1.23 
ACMT -0.288 1.153 0.207 1.29 
AUQUL -1.863 0.194 0.038 1.17 
FISIZE 7.976 1.727 0.000 1.18 
FLEV -0.214 0.040 0.000 1.10 
CFO 0.044 2.398 0.014 1.24 
Model Summary 
R  .7732 
R square  .6342 
Adjusted R square  .6231 
F-value  10.65 
Sig.  0.00 
Dependent variable:   DAC                                                               Significant at .05% 
Where: DAC, discretionary accruals; ACSIZE, audit committee size; ACIND, audit committee independence; 
ACEXP, audit committee member’s expertise; ACMT, audit committee meetings; AUQUL, audit quality; 
FISIZE, firm size; FLEV, financial leverage; CFO,   cash flows from operating activities; and ε, the error term. 
 
The tests for H 4 regarding the relationship between the number of audit committee meetings (ACMT) and 
earnings management, the result in Table 3 and 4 is supported this hypothesis (coefficient = -0.385 and p < 
0.05). This result may support the argument that the number of audit committees meetings does not significantly 
enhance the quality of financial reporting. However, although no statistically significant relationship is detected, 
a negative directional sign of the coefficient is observed. This result is similar to that of Davidson et al., (2005) 
who report an insignificant relationship between the number of audit committee meetings and earnings 
management. Additionally, AbdulRahman and Ali, (2006) find insufficient evidence for a negative relationship 
between earnings management and the frequency of audit committee meetings. 
 
Finally, The H5 states that there is a significantly negative association between audit quality (AUQUL) and 
occurrence of earnings management. As shown in Table 3 and 4, this hypothesis is supported (coefficient = -
0.472 and p < 0.05). This is consistent with prior studies those examine the relation between auditor size and 
total discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones (1991) model. Francis & Yu (1999) find that firms 
which hire a Big 5 auditors report lower discretionary accruals, consistent with Big Five auditors constraining 
opportunistic reporting of accruals. Also, Maijoor & Vanstraelen, (2006) find that companies with non-Big 5 
auditors (a proxy for lower audit quality) report discretionary accruals that significantly increase income 
compared to companies with Big 5 auditors.  
 
Table 3, 4 also, show results from control variables, firm size as measured by the natural log of total assets has a 
significant positive effect on earnings management which corroborate the positive accounting theory’s claim that 
large firms face greater scrutiny from investors, and thus more likely to manage earning to satisfy their forecasts. 
Financial leverage measured by debt-to-assets ratio, the result indicates that there is a negative and significant 
relationship. Also, the result shows that cash flow from operation activity is significantly and negatively related 
with the earnings management indicator. This finding is consistent with the notion that CFO influences the 
magnitude of the discretionary accruals.  
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5. Conclusion and Limitation 
The role of audit committees and audit quality in ensuring the quality of corporate financial reporting has come 
under considerable scrutiny due to recent high-profile earnings management cases in the world. Empirical 
evidences on the effect of audit committee effectiveness and audit quality on the occurrence of earnings 
management is rather inconsistent. Also, there has so far been relatively little or no research into earnings 
management practices in Egypt (Kamel & Elbana, 2012). The multi-cultural roots of Egyptian society make it 
different from other societies and hence distinguish it as a setting for this study. Therefore, the purpose of this 
paper is to examine the association between the audit committee effectiveness, audit quality and earnings 
management practices of more active 50 Egyptian companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange of the non-
financial sector during the period 2007-2010.  
 
After controlling for size, leverage and cash flow from operation activities, the results of univariate and 
multivariate analyses indicated that audit committees independence; experience of audit committee members; audit 
committee meetings; and audit quality have significant negative association with discretionary accruals as a proxy 
for earnings management. On the other hand, no significant relationship is found between audit committees size 
and the level of discretionary accruals. This paper is important because it offers useful information that is of great 
value to policy makers, academics and other stakeholders. 
 
As with any research, limitation of the study is that this study is using a small sample of 40 companies. This 
sample may be small in size and, by construction, composed of the most active Egyptian listed companies and 
thus may not be representative of the population of Egyptian firms, consequently, caution should be considered 
in evaluating the results. Thus, it might have been better to look at companies from a wider range. 
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